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Insights Economic
Economists use a shorthand method
to identify one another. They divide
economic theory—and its practition-
ers—into various “schools” of thought.
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One of the most famous collections 
of thinkers and theoreticians is the
Chicago school, housed at the Uni-
versity of Chicago. The cofounder of
this school, along with Jacob Viner,
was Frank Hyneman Knight. Because
of his position at Chicago and the qual-
ity of his students, Knight became quite
influential, although today his name is
generally unknown to the public.
Knight was born in southern Illi-
nois in 1885, the first of 11 children. 
He attended several small Southern
schools before enrolling at the Univer-
sity of Tennessee, where he earned his
bachelor’s and master’s degrees in two
years. He then entered Cornell Univer-
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS VOLUME 7, NUMBER 3
FRANKH. KNIGHT
Origins of the Chicago School of Economics
sity in 1913. After a year in the philos-
ophy department, he switched to eco-
nomics because his professors decided
that his extreme skepticism would be
more profitably employed there. His
economics dissertation—“A Theory of
Business Profit,” completed in 1916—
was revised and published in 1921
under the title Risk, Uncertainty and
Profit. It has become a classic in the
field.
From his earliest days as a teacher,
Knight’s defining approach to eco-
nomic theory—and most everything
else—was a hard-nosed, often enter-
taining skepticism. Despite his idio-
syncrasies and curmudgeonly de-
meanor, Knight’s students continually
bestowed on him the distinction of
having greatly influenced their think-



































Frank Knight is one of history’s most influential economists. A cofounder of the famous
Chicago school (with Jacob Viner), Knight had a profound influence on those who studied with
him regardless of whether they agreed with his ideas. That is the primary legacy of any great
teacher—that his teachings live on in the work of not just his followers but even his critics.
A crusty old skeptic with no particular compelling classroom skills, Knight yet managed 
to question just about everything his students, and all visiting speakers to Chicago, claimed 
to believe. His support for the free market was based not on some utopian ideology of the per-
fection of human institutions but rather on the reverse premise: We simply are not smart
enough to control one another’s economic choices. Ever the pragmatist, and like Adam Smith
before him, Knight had little faith in the power of human reason to improve the human condi-
tion. He did, however, trust in the outcomes produced by freely interacting individuals to 
further societal welfare.
Few economists have achieved Knight’s pedagogic impact. For that reason, we explore his
life and work in this latest Economic Insights and hope that it might be a point of departure for
readers who wish to examine more closely this remarkable man and his ideas.
— Bob McTeer






the distinction of having
greatly influenced 
their thinking.recipient must be living when the
award is made.
Knight and the Free Market
Knight leveled some corrosive criti-
cisms at capitalism and, simultane-
ously, punctured Marxist and institu-
tionalist anticapitalist economic theory.
He was especially sarcastic when criti-
cizing egalitarian claims because he
viewed society as a complex game in
which there would always be winners
and losers.
2 But he also believed that,
in the long run, income disparities
would widen under capitalism. Al-
though he sometimes backed down
when pressed on the point, especially
by Friedman, he never changed his
mind about this important tendency 
of capitalism, at least as he saw it.
Being suspicious of reform and all
alternative systematic thinking about
the economy, he finally defended capi-
piricists Milton Friedman and George
Stigler, whose own approaches to eco-
nomic problem solving were often
attacked by their mentor. Knight was
opposed to the use of mathematical
models stuffed with real-world data.
He did not believe that prediction in
economics was the benchmark against
which theories ought to be judged.
However, he did agree with one of his
most famous students—Friedman—
that theoretical assumptions were, by
necessity, unrealistic. Many of his stu-
dents disagreed with him on this and
other points; yet as a teacher Knight
must be judged a great success if for
no other reason than that he taught
four future Nobel Memorial Prize win-
ners in economics: Friedman, Stigler,
James Buchanan and Paul Samuelson.
Knight himself would probably have
gotten the award had he not died
shortly after it was added in 1969. The
I also spoke earlier of philosophizing, or preaching, in contrast with more objective dis-
course. A sermon should have a text, and I have found a suitable one in the gospel according 
to “Saint” the Marquis de Talleyrand-Périgord: The only good principle is to have no principles 
(le seule bon principe est de n’en avoir aucun). Talleyrand, to be sure, is not regularly listed
among the evangelists. But he was in fact a bishop in the Church, and another churchman, of
the civilized eighteenth-century French pattern, the abbot Galiani, had earlier stated the same
creed. And anyhow, the saying suits my purpose as a text. It is, no doubt, usually enjoyed and
dismissed as a witty cynicism; but I propose to treat it quite seriously, as a starting point. Not
literally, I admit. It is an epigram; and an epigram has been defined as a half-truth so stated as
to be especially annoying to those who believe in the other half. I wish to stress both halves,
the value of principles as well as their limitations. Accordingly, I must reword the text into one
of rather the opposite literal import. The right principle is to respect all the principles, take them
fully into account, and then use good judgment as to how far to follow one or another in the
case in hand. All principles are false, because all are true—in a sense and to a degree; hence,
none is true in a sense and to a degree which would deny to others a similarly qualified 
truth. There is always a principle, plausible and even sound within limits, to justify any possible
course of action and, of course, the opposite one. The truly right course is a matter of the 
best compromise or the best or “least worst” combination of good and evil. As in cookery, and
in economic theory, it calls for enough and not too much, far enough and not too far, in any
direction. Moreover, the ingredients of policy are always imponderable, hence there can be 
no principle, no formula, for the best compromise. That laws must be stated in sentences 
partly accounts for the familiar “principle,” “the law is an ass.” And if people don’t have good
judgment, or won’t use it, it is “just too bad,” for themselves and for others over whom they
have power. ■
—On the History and Method of Economics, 256
Knight’s Personal Oxymoron: Principled Pragmatism
In spite of all the foregoing, there is
a science of economics, a true, and even
exact, science, which reaches laws as uni-
versal as those of mathematics and
mechanics. The greatest need for the de-
velopment of economics as a growing
body of thought and practice is an ade-
quate appreciation of the meaning, and
the limitations, of this body of accurate
premises and rigorously established con-
clusions. It comes about in the same gen-
eral way as all science, except perhaps in
a higher degree, i.e., through abstraction.
There are no laws regarding the content of
economic behavior, but there are laws uni-
versally valid as to its form. There is an
abstract rationale of all conduct which is
rational at all, and a rationale of all social
relations arising through the organization
of rational activity. We cannot tell what
particular goods any person will desire,
but we can be sure that within limits he
will prefer more of any good to less, and
that there will be limits beyond which the
opposite will be true. We do not know
what specific things will be wealth at any
given place and time, but we know quite
well what must be the attitude of any sane
individual toward wealth wherever a social
situation exists which gives the concept
meaning. In the same way we know that in
any productive operations on this earth
there are some general relations between
quantity of resources used and quantity of
product turned out.
These principles are only less ab-
stract than those of mathematics. It is
never true in reality that two and two make
four; for we cannot add unlike things and
there are no two real things in the uni-
verse which are exactly alike. It is only to
completely abstract units, entirely without
content, that the most familiar laws of
number and quantity apply. Yet no one
questions the practical utility of such
laws. They are infinitely more useful than
they could be if they ever did fit exactly
any single concrete base, since all that
they lose in literal accuracy they gain in
generality of application. By not being
strictly true in any case they are signifi-
cantly true in all. ■
—Selected Essays by Frank H. Knight,
Vol. 1, 28–29
Is Economics a Science?talism on the completely pragmatic
grounds that it may not be perfect, but
it was better than all the alternatives
suggested by its critics.
As Breit and Ransom (1971, 197)
put it:
Like David Hume, he rejected the
view that the solution of social prob-
lems is to be found by the direct
approach to them. And like Adam
Smith, he had little hope that social
reformers or “do-gooders” would
solve problems and he thus was will-
ing to allow the markets to solve
them.
Knight’s attitude of allowing mar-
kets to work out economic problems
led him not only to criticize avowedly
antimarket theorists such as Marx but
also to respond to other types of mar-
ket critics. One of his most famous
responses was to the doctrine of mar-
ket failure developed in A. C. Pigou’s
famous 1920 book The Economics of
Welfare. In that work, Pigou argued
that examples of market failure were
easy to find because of the pervasive-
ness of external costs and benefits that
“spilled over” from market transactions.
Pigou did not argue that each of these
instances of presumed externalities
automatically called for government to
step in and regulate the market.
However, many economists who
came after him enthusiastically used
Pigou’s idea to push for more govern-
ment market interventions. But Knight
was not among them, and he responded
to one of Pigou’s alleged examples of
market failure so persuasively that Pigou
removed it from subsequent editions of
his book. In this case, Knight proved
that Pigou’s road use example wasn’t a
failure of the market at all but a failure
of government to specify accurate
property rights for scarce resources.
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Over the ensuing decades, economists
questioned in detail all cases of claimed
Our preliminary examination of the problem of profit will show, however, that the difficul-
ties in this field have arisen from a confusion of ideas which goes deep down into the founda-
tions of our thinking. The key to the whole tangle will be found to lie in the notion of risk or
uncertainty and the ambiguities concealed therein. It is around this idea, therefore, that our
main argument will finally center. A satisfactory explanation of profit will bring into relief the
nature of the distinction between the perfect competition of theory and the remote approach
which is made to it by the actual competition of, say, twentieth-century United States; and the
answer to this twofold problem is to be found in a thorough examination and criticism of the
concept of Uncertainty, and its bearings upon economic processes.
But Uncertainty must be taken in a sense radically distinct from the familiar notion of Risk,
from which it has never been properly separated. The term “risk,” as loosely used in everyday
speech and in economic discussion, really covers two things which, functionally at least, in their
causal relations to the phenomena of economic organization, are categorically different. The
nature of this confusion will be dealt with at length…but the essence of it may be stated in a few
words at this point. The essential fact is that “risk” means in some cases a quantity susceptible
of measurement, while at other times it is something distinctly not of this character; and there
are far-reaching and crucial differences in the bearings of the phenomenon depending on which
of the two is really present and operating. There are other ambiguities in the term “risk” as well,
which will be pointed out; but this is the most important. It will appear that a measurable uncer-
tainty, or “risk” proper, as we shall use the term, is so far different from an unmeasurable one
that it is not in effect an uncertainty at all. We shall accordingly restrict the term “uncertainty” to
cases of the non-quantitive (sic) type. It is this “true” uncertainty, and not risk, as has been
argued, which forms the basis of a valid theory of profit and accounts for the divergence between
actual and theoretical competition. ■
—Risk, Uncertainty and Profit, 19–20
Risk and Uncertainty Lead to a Theory of Profit
With reference to the use of the cyclical
tendency as an argument for collectivism,
however—or any sweeping action by gov-
ernment outside the monetary field—two
very important sets of facts should be
pointed out. In the first place, with negligible
exceptions, the business cycle does not
work to the advantage of any significant
group or interest in “capitalistic” society.
On the contrary, practically everyone suffers
heavily from it, incurring serious economic
loss, if not privation. Hence the problem of
cycle analysis does not arise out of and does
not involve conflict of interest. This means
that remedial action is a matter of economic
understanding and of political intelligence
and administrative competence, in matters
of an essentially technical character. The
situation would hardly seem to call for solu-
tion along lines which would involve the
most intense conflicts of interest and would
raise the most serious political problems in
that regard, while, in addition, the technical
organization problems in connection with
establishing and operating a collectivist econ-
omy would presumably be of infinitely greater
magnitude than those involved in the con-
trol of one detail of it, the monetary system.
The second set of facts relates to the
nature of the problem as it would present
itself to the government of a collectivist
society. If a collectivistic, or socialistic, state
is to preserve any of the traditional eco-
nomic liberties of individuals, it also must
operate on the basis of money and market
transactions, with prices of products and of
productive services controlled by competi-
tion, in essentially the same manner as in
the enterprise system. The fact that the
government would be the chief owner of pro-
ductive wealth, and the “entrepreneur” in
the great bulk of economic activity, would
not change things in that regard….In any
other sense, the argument for collectivism
from the standpoint of the problem of the
business cycle does not seem to have much
force. The general presumption is that, as
already suggested, the control of all features
of a national economy by a central authority
would present much greater difficulty than
the control of one feature. ■
—On the History and Method of 
Economics, 225–26
Socialism as an “Answer”
for Business CyclesAs Stigler writes about the place 
of economics in Knight’s view of the
world, its primary function “is to con-
tribute to the understanding of how by
consensus based on rational discussion
we can fashion liberal society in which
individual freedom is preserved and 
a satisfactory economic performance
achieved. This vast social undertaking
allows only a small role for the econo-
mist, and that role requires only a cor-
rect understanding of the central core
of value theory.”
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Legacy of the Chicago School
Knight is clearly the intellectual
godfather of the Chicago school. Even
students who disagreed with him on
many issues relate that he was the 
professor who most influenced them
during their days at the University of
Chicago. The Chicago school is far
from some monolithic set of beliefs 
to which all its members subscribe.
Knight’s extreme skepticism and lack
of slavish deference to authority be-
came the twin pillars of the school’s
long and storied approach to theory
and policy, and that is Knight’s endur-
ing legacy. ■
—R obert L. Formaini
Senior Economist
Notes
1 Alternatively, after Thomas Kuhn, economists
refer to paradigms. A paradigm is a discipli-
nary matrix by which a group of people inter-
pret the world around them. See Kuhn
(1996).
2 Formaini (1999).
3 The details of the exchange can be found in
Breit and Ransom (1971, 192–96).
4 On scientism, see Hayek (1988), especially
chapters 1, 4 and 5.
5 Stigler (1987, 58).
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